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The Federal Government is today a bureaucracy of almost
overwhelming magnitude. It presents a management problem of
increasing consequence to every American from the standpoint
of quality and any aspect of size—dollars, numbers of people,
or scope of operations. Nearly every facet of our life today
depends to some extent on what the Government does or does not
do. We look to our Government to insure that the proper
programs are initiated and properly administered and
increasingly we look for it to regulate the distribution of
scarce human and material resources. The resulting challenge
to good management is staggering.
Furthermore, the problems which must be solved seem to
be increasing. As we learn of the need to control even our
use of our air and water, new social programs and defense
needs are competing for scarce tax dollars at a time when
alternatives are narrowing. In Fiscal Year 1971 it was
estimated that 69 per cent of total Government expenditures
were uncontrollable— that past decisions had reduced our
current alternatives to the point where only 31 per cent of
current expenditures would be determined by current decisions.

2This proportion of current expenditures subject to current
decisions was down from 34 per cent in 1970 and 36 per cent in
1969. The problem, therefore, is not simply of deciding what
to do next, but of insuring that past decisions are relevant
to current problems and that maximum benefit is being derived
from each dollar spent. The burden of these decisions falls
on the President as the chief executive.
Unlike a legislature, a President should vie;;
the passage of a law as a beginning, not an end.
His responsibility does not cease when he has
decided what to do. The less politically rewarding
and often complex task of determining how to do it
must be undertaken by the executive, if programs
are to produce results.
2
In 1968, Bertram M. Gross, Professor of Political
Science, Syracuse University, urged the creation of a new
Hoover Commission to chart the managerial revolution necessary
to cope with what might otherwise become the totally
unmanageable problems of the post-Vietnam period. 5 In 1969,
President Nixon formed the President's Advisory Council on
Executive Organization. And so another study group would add
its wisdom to the twelve previous groups which had in the past
^-U.S., President, .The Budge t of the United States
Government: Fiscal Year 1971 (Washington. D.C. : Government
Printing Office, 1970TT~P«42.
^Harold Seidman, Politics. Position, and Power: The
Dynamics of Fe deral Organization (New York : Oxford
University Press, 1970 J, p. 6B.
5u.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Government
Operations, Establish a Comnlsslon on the Organization and
Management of th e Executive Branch. , Hearing, before the
Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization of the Committee on
Government Operations, United States Senate, on S. 2116, S. 47,
S. 2832, S. 1929, S. 2032, 90th Cong., 2d sess., 1968, p. 25.

3studied the problems of the Federal Government." A major
result of the latest effort became Reorganization Plan No. 2
of 1970, which made changes in the structure of the Executive
Office of the President primarily to improve the President's
capability to meet the management challenge.
But the Bureau of the Budget, now the Office of
Management and Budget, has had unbroken responsibilities for
management improvement since its creation in 1921. Section
209 of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (see Appendix A)
assigned the Bureau of the Budget responsibility for
"securing greater economy and efficiency in the conduct of the
public service." Moreover, the Bureau of the Budget had cone
to be considered by many as the most important aggregation of
executive power in the history of the country. Previous
studies had focused on the Bureau of the Budget, seeking in
part to improve its capability as the President's management
tool. The management role is not new to the Bureau of the
Budget, nor are changes designed to improve its managerial
performance.
Given the magnitude of the Government's managerial
problem and the role which improved management must play, the
pertinent question becomes: Has Reorganization Plan Bo. 2 of
1Ibid .. Exhibit 47, p. 607.
^See Gross 1 further comments, 00. clt .. p. 25; and
U.S., Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of
the Government, Task Force Report on Fiscal. Budgeting;, and
Accounting ActlvTtielTTAT>^en-lix'""Fl (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1946)', p. 46.

41970 contributed to the President's capability to bring better
management to the Federal Government? This paper is in search
of an answer to this question. Before this can be done,
however, the difficulties previously experienced by the Bureau
of the Budget in fulfilling its management function must be
explored. The causes of any shortcomings must be identified,
and previous attempts at correction examined. To the extent
that the problem is complex, no simple answer is anticipated.
Others before the President's Advisory Council on Executive
Organization have searched for solutions to the problem, and
it is to be expected that the future will bring other attempts.
Pinal solutions to human organization are elusive if only
because our understanding is incomplete. Changing
personalities and conditions preclude a definitive solution,
and this must Influence the evaluation which seeks to answer
the subject question.
Insufficient time has passed since the Office of
Management and Budget was created to allow a comprehensive
evaluation based on performance. This evaluation must
therefore attempt to answer the question from the standpoint
of the development of the Bureau of the Budget's management
function, what past studies have revealed, and the results of
corrective steps previously taken. The insights gleaned from
this effort will be useful in examining the thinking which
resulted in Reorganization Plan No. 2, insofar as this thinking
can be determined. Since there often are significant deviations

5between the thought and the implementation, the results of
Reorganization Plan No. 2 within the Office of Management and
Budget will also be examined to the extent currently feasible.
No evaluation of a political institution like the
Office of Management and Budget could be considered complete
without recourse to the political environment in which it
functions. Introduction of the full political element,
however, would expand the scope of this paper beyond all
reasonable bounds. The political factors inherent in the
history of the Bureau of the Budget, the performance of its
management function, and the results which might, therefore,
be predicted for the Office of Management and Budget, could
easily constitute a separate paper of equal if not greater
length. The discovery of a recent book1 which deals with the
politics of Government organization was fortunate, since, by
relying heavily on its analysis, at least a limited political
dimension can be introduced without exceeding the bounds of
feasibility.
Much, but not all, material relevant to this evaluation
is a matter of public record. The reports of prior studies,
books, Congressional documents, as well as current literature
will be used extensively. However, very little of this material
^Seldman, opjA_qigt. This excellent book presents an
account of Governmental organization and administration in the
political environment from the standpoint of both a scholar of
government and from the author's broad practical experience
from his career with the Bureau of the Budget.

6has been oriented to the management function. For the most
part the primary concern has been with the budgetary function
of the Bureau of the Budget. So while much of the material
is certainly not new, the management orientation of this study
has required a somewhat different perspective. As a result,
published material was somewhat lacking. Personnel of the
Office of Management and Budget Library have been most helpful
in this respect. By allowing access to internal, unpublished
documents of the new Office and its predecessor Bureau, many
of these information gaps have been bridged. Interviews with
various officials of the Office of Management and Budget have
been sought, not always with success, despite the additional
workload these people are carrying as a result of the subject
reorganization and subsequent reorganization proposals
relating to other institutions of the Executive Branch. When
granted, these interviews serve to provide new insights to the
printed history, stimulate new awareness of the depth of the
problem, and Indicate current trends and attitudes.
Records and reports of the President's Advisory Council
on Executive Organization are considered to be Presidential
documents not a part of the public record. ^ While some of the
Commonly called the "Ash Council," and it is this
designation which will be used henceforth.
2U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government
Opera tio ns , Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1970 (Office of
Management and Budget; Domestic Council"). Hearings, before a
Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House
of Representatives, 91st Cong., 2d sess., 1970, pp. 16-17.

7work of the Ash Council has been made public, the records
pertaining to Reorganization Plan No. 2 have not been disclosed.
Fortunately a part of the Ash Council Staff was found to be
still working in Washington, D.C. Interviews were obtained
with Thomas Walker, Assistant to the Executive Director of the
Ash Council, on 20 and 27 January and on 21 February 1971.
During the course of these interviews, selected papers of the
Ash Council were made available for review. These documents
were made available with the stipulation that no direct
reference to them would be made. In view of these confidences,
no direct reference will be made to material gathered from
this source. JIaterlal used in developing the Ash Council's
background, method of operation, organization, and
recommendations came from this source unless specifically
indicated otherwise.
The records of some previous studies which have dealt
with the subject of governmental organization are similarly
restricted. Unfortunately, no information about the
Rockefeller Committee could be obtained. From the one brief
reference made of this prior effort, it appears that this
w group was thinking along lines similar to those of the Ash
Council.
Subsequent chapters in this paper will deal first with
the origin and later development of the management function in
the Bureau of the Budget. In the nearly fifty years of the
iSee Chapter III, p. 42, footnote 1.

8Bureau's history, it has been examined several times for
potential improvement. While not all of these studies have
been specifically oriented to the management function, at no
time have management considerations been far removed. Since
these studies in the aggregate represent considerable depth
of experience and talent, a foundation for the consideration
of the more recent changes will evolve. Next the philosophy,
organization, and methods of the Ash Council will be examined
for insights into the reasons for their recommendations.
Thirdly, the resulting Reorganization Plan and its implementa-
tion will be explored to see how closely the end result
conformed to the recommendations, and to reveal any parallels
with past efforts. Finally, the results of these examinations
will be brought together in search of an answer to the main
thrust of this inquiry: Has Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1970
contributed to the President's capability to bring better
management to the Federal Government?

CHAPTER II
THE BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
The_T_JTs^_Yeaxs
The Bureau of the Budget was established as a part of
the Treasury Department but reporting directly to the President
by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. The first Director,
Charles G. Dawes, was a man of drive and energy, a prominent
business man. He was no novice and was a resourceful
inaugurator.l But while Dawes was particularly successful in
getting the new Bureau of the Budget off to an auspicious
start, his Immediate emphasis was to see that "coal is not
wasted. 1'2 In his preoccupation with establishing fiscal control
over the previously independent agencies, and with economy in
the narrow sense, the responsibility for conducting studies in
administrative reorganization was not developed. The management
function vested in the Bureau of the Budget by the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921 was allowed to wither before it really
became established. Further, while Dawes left behind a well
established pattern of activity and high grade administration,
^Fritz Morstein Marx, "The Bureau of the Budget: Its
Evolution and Present Role," The American Political Science
Review
.
Part I (August, 1945), 669.
2Jesse Burkhead, Government Budgeting (New York: John
Wiley & Son3, Inc., 1956), p. "2H9T"
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he left no clearly defined legacy of tasks yet to be performed.
"The psychological moment for designing and carrying out the
'comprehensive reform 1 which Dawes himself has regarded as
essential was allowed to pass.'
Although no voice was raised in the Congressional
Hearings which would restrict the definition of the Bureau of
the Budget's mandate, Dawes was faced with potential conflict
with the Joint Congressional Committee on Reorganization of
the Administrative Branch of the Government which was given a
similar mandate in December 1920. Dawes believed that in
deferring to the Joint Committee, he was exercising "good
tactics" which would tend to allay Congressional criticism of
his young Bureau. "I agreed with Hon. Walter F. Brown, Chairman
of the Joint Committee, to leave to them leadership in preparing
the outline plan of the regrouping and reclassification of
government activities." Further, "The President has decided
that Congress shall take the lead in the matter of indicating
the proper plans for regrouping and reclassifying governmental
activities: so we won't stumble over each other's heels and
duplicate work." But there was little opportunity for
^orstein Marx, "Bureau of the Budget," 679-680.
2 Ibid
. , 663, 676.
^Charles Gates Dawes, The First Year of the Budget of




duplication of work since the Joint Committee had little staff
and was unable to make a contribution. Thus was the opportunity
lost and "the major criticism which can be directed against the
Dawes approach is the failure of the Bureau to take the
initiative in governmental reorganization."
The Dawes approach is described as being prescribed by
the dominant sentiments of his time and that this held the
management role of the Bureau of the Budget to an emphasis on
expenditure reduction through budget review until the 1930's.
But while the initial opportunity was lost, the potential of
the Bureau of the Budget as an instrument of true management
improvement remained. The pressures of the country's internal
economic condition and the emerging conflicts abroad during
the 1930 's forced continued examination of the Bureau of the
Budget's management role. A restricted view of economy and
efficiency was increasingly found to be inadequate. Finally
a Division of Research and Investigation was established by
Bureau of the Budget Office Memorandum No. 15 in 1935. This
was the first attempt to provide the administrative structure
necessary to fulfill the Bureau's responsibility for the
management function under Section 209 of the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921.
5
1Burknead, Government Budgeting, p. 291.
2 Ibid., pp. 290-292.
^Mary Lou Shantz, "The Division of Administrative
Management of the Bureau of the Budget: 1939-1952" (Unpublished
paper prepared for the Office of Management and Organization,
Bureau of the Budget, Yfeshington, D.C., 1959), p. 3.
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President Roosevelt, in further search of solutions,
requested suggestions from Dr. Charles Merriam. In October,
1935, Merriam submitted the concept of an advisory committee
to the President which would be responsible for preparing
recommendations on executive coordination and administrative
management. Brownlow was later to describe this recommendation
as a "plan for a plan."^
The_BrownLQJi^j3CLmjJbte.e.
Although the developing pressures had created some
initial response, the management function of the Bureau of the.
Budget remained essentially dormant until 1937. The Report
of the President's Committee on Administrative Management2 was
submitted January 8, 1937. This report has been called a
return to notions expressed in the Budget and Accounting Act
of 1921; a rediscovery of prior purpose. 3 The Brownlow
Committee found that:
The President needs a research agency to
: investigate the broad problems involved in the
administrative management of the Government--
problems of administrative organization, finance,
coordination, procedures and methods of work, and
the many technical aspects of management. The
function of investigation and research into
administrative problems should be developed as an
aid to over-all executive management.
ilblLd
. , pp. 5-6.
^Commonly called the "Brownlow Committee" after its
chairman, Louis 3rownlow, and it is this designation which
will be used henceforth.
3Morstein Marx, "Bureau of the Budget," 682.
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Economy and efficiency in government require
constant investigation and reorganization of the
administrative structure. It is a mistake to assume
that the Government can be reorganized once for
a jl J. • • • •
A division of administrative research in the
Bureau of the Budget is the logical place to
develop these functions which were authorized in
the act of 1921. . . .1 ,
The Bureau of the Budget, as a managerial arm
of the President, should investigate broader
problems of organization which affect two or more
departments and should render expert information
and advice to the President upon proposed changes.
It should also render expert assistance to the
,.-.._ departments upon the organizational problems and
••'should have authority to conduct investigations
'-4'* upon its own initiative.
. .
.2
In view of these findings, the Brownlow Committee
recommended that:
3. The administrative research function of
the Bureau of the Budget should be adequately
developed to aid the President in his duties as
head of the executive establishment. The Bureau
should carry on constructive studies in public
administration for the constant improvement of
Government organization and procedures and should
also stimulate continuous study of these problems
by departments and bureaus.
3
Congress did not act on the Brownlow Committee's
recommendations which were transmitted to Congress on
January 12, 1937. The session ended before action could be
taken. Growing political opposition to President Roosevelt's
^U.S., President's Committee on Administrative
Management (Brownlow Committee), Report Mof_the_Pxesldent '
s
.Committee (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
193T57T." 18.
2lkU., P. 34.
3 Ibid ., p. 19.
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other programs was a factor in the defeat of the reorganiza-
tion proposals In the following session. * The issue was not
dead, however. The stage was set for action with the appoint-
ment of Harold D. Smith as Director of the Bureau of the Budget
in April, 1939. 2 On July 1, 1939, Donald C. Stone was
appointed head of a new division charged with the management
and organization responsibilities of Section 209 of the Budget
and Accounting Act. YJhile the new division retained the name
of the Division of Research and Investigation for the time
being, a new course was being charted.
Stone was an academician—a scholar of public
administration. He was not lacking in practical
experience, however, having worked in municipal
administration, in national and international
public administration organizations, as executive
director of the Public Administrative Service, and
as a consultant for a host of Government agencies.-?
He believed in the role of long-term planning rather than
becoming absorbed in the immediate and routine. By the time
»
the Brownlow Committee recommendations were finally implemented
by the Reorganization Act of 1939, the division was well under
way on its new course.
5
3-Shantz, "Division of Administrative Management, " p. 11.
2£urkhead, Government Budgeting, pp. 293-294.
^Shantz, "Division of Administrative Management," p. 11.





By Executive Order 8248 of September 8, 1939,
the President placed upon his newly established
Executive Office certain management responsi-
bilities and delegated them to the Bureau of the
Budget, which was directed:
To conduct research in the development of
improved plans of administrative management,
and to advise the executive departments and
agencies of the Government with respect to
improved administrative organization and practice.
To aid the President to bring about more
efficient and economical conduct of Government
service.
1
The Bureau of the Budget had been given new, explicit
instructions which emphasized the management role it had
originally been expected to assume. This role was clearly to
be one of broad responsibility for the proper management of
the Executive Branch and not limited to a narrow conception of
economy and efficiency. Transformation of the Bureau of the
Budget's management role was accomplished within about two
years' time under the direction of Smith. To a considerable
extent, these efforts reflected the philosophy, predilections,
and strengths of Stone and Smith. 3 With this new impetus, the
Division of Research and Investigation grew into the Division
of Administrative Management.^
With its transfer from the Treasury Department to the
Executive Office of the President, and having become the top
Ipercival Flack Brundage, The .Bureau of the Budget
(New lork: Praeger Publishers, 1970)~pT~B4.
2Burkhead, Government Budgeting, pp. 293-294.
^Shantz, "Division of Administrative Management, " p. 10.
^Morstein Marx, "Bureau of the Budget," 684.
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managerial agency of the President, the Bureau of the Budget
began to expand its staff, increasing vrithln the next five
years to over 600 persons.
The Bureau was now much more than an agency
to assist the President in the formulation of his
budget and in the review of current expenditures;
it also . . . surveyed administrative organization
and practices and made proposals for readjustments
looking toward improved management.!
Shortage of trained personnel was, however, a pressing
problem for the new Division of Administrative Management.
Despite intensive recruitment, only two permanent additions to
division staff could be made by the end of 1939 and only
eleven more by the end of 1940. The division was forced to
rely heavily on temporary personnel. Although the work of the
division was patterned after the Brownlow Committee
recommendations, the encouragement of departments to study
their own organizations and procedural problems could make
little progress since the agencies also had a shortage of
management analysts. As a result, such help as could be
provided was often direct. The effectiveness of the division
during this period is difficult to weigh. The course was new,
and there was little experience on which to draw. There were
no formal relationships with the various agencies which could
be exploited. The Division was successful in breaking new
ground and invaluable contacts were formed with agencies and
^U.S., Commission on Organization (First Hoover
Commission), Task Force Report , p. 45.
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a good reputation was established for use in future years.
By the end of 1940 a staff of thirty-seven was on board and
this was increased to seventy-seven by June 30, 1942. During
Fiscal Year 1943, the average number of professional staff
members totaled seventy-five. By the end of V/orld War II,
management improvement activities were increasingly directed
toward installing "self-help" in agencies rather than toward
assisting agencies directly. 2
The Division of Administrative Management became the
Bureau's second largest division, and a large number of studies
within the Bureau originated as an incidental product of past
or current studies undertaken by the Division. Its attention
focused on solutions to organizational problems and development
of good management in the Executive Branch, helping agencies
strengthen staff and services and to utilize tested business
practices, fostering improvement and simplification of
government~wide procedures and operating techniques, working
out plans for structural arrangements in the Executive Branch
and assisting in the establishment, realignment, reconversion
or liquidation of agencies or agency units. It is reported
that activation of the Bureau of the Budget for administrative
studies gave rise to commonly accepted standards of executive
management.
5




^Morsteln Marx, "Bureau of the Budget," Part II
(September, 1945), 887, 892.
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The .First. Hoover Commission
By 1949, the Task Force on Fiscal, Budgeting, and
Accounting Activities of the Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government described the Bureau of
the Budget as having built itself into the most powerful
bureaucracy in the Government. But the Task Force also found
that growth had fostered some highly undesirable bureaucratic
characteristics. It found that the Bureau of the Budget had
institutionalized many of its processes and introduced
rigidities into its operations which reduced the flexibility
of its staff. Another draw-back to securing the best work
from the staff of the Bureau was found to be a tendency to
overspeclalizatlon. This practice--especially in the Fiscal,
Estimates and Administrative Management Divisions—was to find
a definite niche for each new member, then to put him in it
and keep him there. The Task Force found that a large part of
the Bureau's staff had been needlessly split up into divisions,
sections and groups, with the result that bureaucratic boundaries
were erected which made collaboration difficult in fields which
cut across these lines. The Task Force found that the result
was an introduction of organizational difficulties and rigidity
which could not be overcome even by the most superior top-level
2
management of the Bureau.
Commonly called the "First Hoover Commission" in honor
of its chairman, former President Herbert Hoover, and It is
this designation which shall be used henceforth.
^U.S., Commission on Organization (First Hoover
Commission), Task Force Report, pp. 46-47, 61.
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Specifically with respect to the Division of
Administrative Management, the Task Force found:
The Division of Administrative Management has
done some good work during the 9 years since it was
established. But this work has been done on a
casual basis. Ho comprehensive approach looking
toward organizational and management improvement
has been planned or utilized by the Division.
And there has been no insistence on the part of the
Bureau's leadership that such an approach should be
made. Indeed, the Division has operated largely
on the theory that the work which voluntarily came
to it from day to day was the important work for it
to do. This seems much too fortuitous for either
maximum effectiveness or accomplishment. . . .
It has not had, nor has it sought, the authority
to require the application of its proposals.
Whether this attitude is the best for
accomplishing the desired ends is open to serious
question. The Division has depended more upon
training conferences to inform operating personnel
than upon practical demonstrations and extensive
applications. The applications which are made
depend largely upon the willingness of the
operating agencies to accept them. And there is
no assurance that the areas of acceptance are the
areas of greatest need; the contrary is likely to
be the case.l
The First Hoover Commission in its report acknowledged
the points made by the Task Force, but chose to emphasize the
estimates function rather than the management function. The
report stated that while the extent to which the Administrative
Management Division must draw on the Estimates Division for
information was appreciated, the Bureau had not been able to
take advantage to an equal extent of the contribution that
administrative management work could make in the preparation





expenditures. The Commission stated that the Government was
entering upon a period of vigorous reorganization and that:
"The Administrative Management Division of the Office of the
Budget, which supplied the technical assistance in preparing
the reorganization plans under the Reorganization Acts of 1939
and 194-5, must be the nucleus of such work." The Commission
believed that the Administrative Management Division should
be expanded and strengthened. Specifically, the First Hoover
Commission recommended (Recommendation No. 7) that:
In dealing with the budgets of the executive
departments and agencies, the Office of the Budget
should place much greater emphasis on the developing
of policies and standards to govern the preparation
of estimates and .... Further emphasis should
be placed on the management research function,
particularly as it affects the field services. •*
While thus recognizing the vital role to be played by
the Administrative Management Division, the First Hoover
Commission emphasized the rigidity of the internal structure
of the Bureau of the Budget and the management difficulties
which resulted. Emphasis was placed on the need for the
Estimates Division to use and apply the knowledge gleaned by
the Administrative Management Division. By implication, if not
by intent, priority was given to the estimates function, and
this could be interpreted as tacit approval of the narrow
concept of economy and efficiency which was being pursued.
^U.S., Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government (First Hoover Commission), Budgeting;
and Accounting:: A Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1949), PP- 26-27.
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Burkhead, for instance, summarized the recommendation by-
stating: "The Commission
. . . recommended that the work of
the Administrative Management, Fiscal, and Estimates Divisions
be coordinated to place greater emphasis on the review and
revision of estimates."1
During and subsequent to the First Hoover Commission,
the activities of the Division of Administrative Management
have been characterized as follows
:
. . . First, the Division did staff work for
the President's Advisory Committee on Management.
Second, it promoted improved governmentwide
procedures. . . . The final, and most
characteristic approach during the cold-war years,
was that of Division stimulation and review of
the agencies own management and improvement
program. . . .
... In some respects the Division had
gained in stature and influence. The reduction
in staff, the slackened rate of personnel turnover,
and physical consolidation all facilitated
communication and top-side coordination. As a
result the Division was better able to pursue a
coherent, long-term program. . . .
During the same period, the Division's
effectiveness was impaired by the competition of
other government bodies engaged in Identical
functions. Efforts in long-term reorganization
diminished with duplication by the Hoover Commission
in 1948. . , .
A second obstacle to the Division's success was
the ineffectiveness of its new approach to manage-
ment improvement. Reports submitted on each
agency's management improvement program were too
voluminous to be meaningful and their analysis
reduced the man-hours available for developing
improved standards. . . .
A third element weakening the impact of the
Division efforts was the degeneration in executive-
legislative relations after 1950. Suspicious of any
staff agency to the President, Congress often refused
1Burkhead, Government Budgeting, p. 296.
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to admit that Bureau recommendations had any
independent validity. As a result, they often
ignored Bureau advice on principles of management
and organization.
A growing awareness within the Bureau of the
Budget that many of its weaknesses were perpetuated
by its organizational structure, culminated in an
internal reorganization in 1952. . . .1
In 1946, average permanent employment in the Division
of Administrative Management was 113 including both professional
and secretarial staff. By 1947, this was reduced to 103; in
1948, to 92; in 1949, to 79; in 1950, to 74; and in 1951, to
68. With the internal reorganization in March, 1952, the
Division of Administrative Management was changed to the new
Office of Management and Organization and reduced to 44
p
positions.
Five realigned program divisions emerged from the 1952
reorganization which combined estimates, management improvement
and economic analysis (see Appendix B). Four offices were
created including the Office of Management and Organization
which numbered about twenty-eight professionals. The Office
of Management and Organization was given responsibility for
specific management improvement studies channeled through the
program divisions^ and responsibility for government-wide
^Shantz, "Division of Administrative Management," 34-35.
2Ibid.. 26-31.
^The functional statement specified that the Office of
Management and Organization ". . . assists the divisions in
improving agency organization and management; . • . .
"
U.S., Bureau of the Budget, "Functions and Organization"
(Unpublished paper, Washington, D.C., September 18, 1952), p. 4.
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surveys of an inter-agency character. The latter aspect
included work methods and organization, personnel, fiscal and
accounting activities, and preparation or review of all
reorganization plans which the President transmits to Congress.
The result was an organization structure which emphasized the
estimates function, which Burkhead believed was in response
to the First Hoover Commission recommendation. The Bureau's
own view of this reorganization was:
In April 1952 the Bureau instituted a new
internal organization to achieve three main purposes:
(a) a better grouping of functions and a stronger
supervisory structure to secure continuing consider-
ation within the Bureau of the interrelation of
budgetary, fiscal, management, and legislative
problems with respect to major areas of the
Government's program; (b) a deployment of the
Bureau's staff of specialists to obtain more
effective use of its limited manpower resources;
and (c) a strengthening of the Bureau's working
relationships with the agencies of the executive
branch, with which the Bureau deals on a continuing
basis.
. . . The general lines of reorganization
reflect not only the results of prior thought within
the Bureau but also proposals that originated out-
side the Bureau, especially in the work of the First
Hoover Commission.
2
The second Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch
of the Government,-^ in its review of events since the preceding
investigation, states that the 1952 reorganization made it
^Burkhead, Government Budgeting, pp. 296-298.
2U.S., Bureau of the Budget, "The Bureau of the Budget"
(Unpublished paper, Washington, D.C., October, I960), pp. 4-5.
^Commonly called the "Second Hoover Commission" and it
Is this designation which will be used henceforth.
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possible for the Bureau of the Budget to better coordinate its
budget review function with its management, fiscal, and
legislative review activities.
The Se cond Hoover Commission
The Second Hoover Commission Task Force defined the
objectives of the budgetary process in tiro parts: a) To
decide the extent to which each of the various programs and
activities of the Federal Government shall be carried on; and
b) To insure that each program is carried out at minimum cost
to the Government. Discussion of these objectives includes
the following:
The budget staffs in both the Congress and the
executive branch are concerned in varying degrees
with each of these objectives. In the first place
they are concerned with achieving a unified program
that will best serve the country s total objectives.
... In the second place, the budgetary agencies
necessarily should be concerned with the economy
and efficiency of Government operations. They
should be able not only to detect waste but as well
to promote improved efficiency whereby results can
be accomplished at minimum cost.^
While this does reaffirm the role of budgetary agencies in the
management improvement function, taken alone It could be
interpreted in the narrow sense of economy and efficiency.
That a broad Interpretation is intended, however, seems clear
from other discussion:
^U.S., Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government (Second Hoover Commission), Task
Force Report on Budget and Accounting in the United Sta tes





The Presidential management responsibilities
include also the constant search for more efficient
ways to carry out Government operations. He ^the
President/ is directly responsible for the division
of Federal activities among the various agencies,
and where efficiency can be Improved by reorganiza-
tion, he is required to submit" reorganization plans
to the Congress. He is also responsible for
efficient management within the agencies, but here
his role is more like that of the Congress with
respect to the executive branch as a whole. . . .
Finally, the Bureau of the Budget has the
responsibility to check and advise department heads
of possibilities and methods of improving efficiency
through better organization and procedures. It
should serve as the right arm of the President in
improving the management of the executive agencies.
^
Having thus defined budgetary objectives and the role
of the Bureau of the Budget, the Task Force noted that the
focal point in the Bureau f s organization for promoting manage*
ment and improvement was the Office of Management and
Organization. The Task Force acknowledged that this office
had been credited with a number of reorganization plans
affecting the executive agencies. But once again the role
assumed by the Bureau of the Budget was considered to be more
limited than intended:
Notwithstanding these activities, the Bureau's
concept of its broader role as the managerial arm of
the President has been limited. . . . The primary
emphasis on budget mechanics has tended to obscure
the Bureau's broader responsibilities. The Bureau's
present title, organization, staffing and operating
methods stress its budget responsibilities and
subordinate its overall management and policy
functions. ... In order to carry out its manage-
ment responsibilities the Bureau of the Budget
should be revitalized.
1 Ibld .. pp. 13-14.
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In recognition of the Bureau's management role, the Tack Force
recommended that a change in the name of the Bureau v/ould
assist in developing consciousness, both within and without
Government, of the true role of the Bureau of the Budget. 1
The Sscond Hoover Commission closely followed the lead
of its Task Force. It reported that the Bureau's overall
management and policy function had been subordinated by its
responsibilities for budget preparation and that emphasis had
been placed on budget mechanics. The Second Hoover Commission
concurred that the Bureau of the Budget should be revitalized
to meet its management responsibilities beyond budget
preparation and control. While the Second Hoover Commission
did not recommend that the Bureau's name be changed, it did
take specific note of the Task Force's suggestion that the
name be changed to "The Office of Budget and Executive
Management." Specifically, the applicable recommendation of
the Second Hoover Commission was
:
Recommendation No. 1
(a) That the Bureau of the Budget expand and
make more effective the discharge of its managerial
and budgeting functions;
(b) That in order to do this, among other
things, it should place in important agencies one
or more well qualified employees whose duties
should include continuous year-around review, at
the site of the agency, of agency budget preparation
and administration and other facets of the Bureau's
management responsibilities; and
1 Ibid .. p. 18.
^U.S., Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government (Second Hoover Commission), Budget and
Accounting: A Report.Jbo..th_e_J3o.ngress
[
( Washing ton, D . C .
:
Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 5.
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(c) If necessary, the Congress should
increase the resources of the Bureau of the
Budget for that purpose.!
Response to the Second Hoover Commission recommendation
with respect to the Bureau's management improvement responsi-
bilities was not immediately discernible. Burkhead notes that
the Bureau in recent years has conducted very few major
management improvement studies, but qualified his remark by
stating that the tendency in the Federal Government seems to
be toward a strengthening of this type of work in the agencies
themselves, with coordinating and stimulating influence in the
hands of the Bureau. 2 This tendency, if true, could be
interpreted as being in accordance with the recommendation of
the Second Hoover Commission. Action of this nature would have
the effect of making the Bureau's contribution to management
improvement less visible and consequently far more difficult
to evaluate.
jjntjsrnal Reorganization
While the Office of Management and Organization's
functional statement had been changed in 1955 from "assist the
divisions" to ". . . and gives guidance and advice to the
divisions . . . , "* the staff position of the Office was not
X
Ibld'» P« 7.
2Burkhead, Governm en t __Bu
d
% e tin^ , p. 285. It should be
noted that this book was published in 195o, one year after the
Second Hoover Commission Report.
3u.S., Bureau of the Budget, "Functions and Organization"
(Unpublished paper, Washington, D.C., July 1, 1955), p. 4.
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changed. Although the /ears subsequent to the Second Hoover
Commission brought a series of internal reorganizations, none
gave the life to the managerial recommendations which was so
clearly required. Working relationships with other Government
agencies continued to be through the Divisions which in 1965
were raised to seven in number (see Appendix 0). With the
exception of the Office of Budget Review, the Office designation
was applied to the Bureau's non-budgetary activities while
Division status was accorded the budgetary activities, which
as line organizations represented the main thrust of the
Bureau's effort. In 1967 the number of divisions was cut once
again to five (see Appendix D). At this time, the Office of
Management and Organization was abolished, its activities being
transferred to other parts of the Bureau and two new organiza-
tional entities. The newly established General Government
Management Division vras assigned responsibility for government-
wide problems in personnel, procurement, and automatic data
processing. The new Office of Executive Management was made
responsible for the government organization function.
The new Office of Executive Management was Initially
composed of five major units: 1) Management Systems Staff with
responsibility for major interagency-intergovernmental manage-
ment problems, 2) Operational Coordination Staff to integrate
the Bureau's day-to-day activities, 3) Government Organization
Staff to be responsible for the improvement of executive branch
^Brundage, The Bureau of the Budget, pp. 85-86.
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organizational structure, 4) Special Projects Staff to deal
with government-wide management problems, and 5) Financial
Management Staff to be drawn from the previous Office of
Financial Management.^- Two functions previously performed by
the Office of Management and Organization were discontinued;
the joint management surveys and management research activities,
2
e.g., operations research.
As a result of this reorganization, the management
functions were dispursed, adding to coordination problems
within the Bureau.* While an organizational entity remained
on the books which gave the appearance of fulfilling the
Bureau's management Improvement responsibility, the focus of
the effort had been diffused to the point that little by way of
results could be expected. The major force behind this
reorganization seems to have been an attempt to better cope
with the changing environment faced by the Bureau of the
Budget
—
particularly with regard to the Impact of the social
legislation of the "Great Society, " implementation of the
Planning-Programralng-Budgeting System, and the management style
of the incumbent President. The conclusion appears to have
been that certain problems were of such urgency that other
lU.S., Bureau of the Budget, "Organizational and
Personnel Changes" (Unpublished memorandum from the Director,
Washington, D.O., August 4, 1967), p. 2.
2U.S., Bureau of the Budget, "The Work of the Steering
Group on Evaluation of the Bureau of the Budget: a Staff
Summary" (Unpublished Report, Washington, D.C., July, 1967),
p. 2-27.
^Brundage, The, Bureau of the Budget, pp. 86-87.
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existing functions such as those noted above would have to be
discontinued or moved out of the Bureau. *• In comments relevant
to this period, Seidman notes that:
• . . Some Yftilte House staff during the
Johnson administration successfully pressured the
Bureau to devote more of its resources to the
developing constructive program proposals and
coordinating operations. The Bureau always has
played a significant role in both areas, but on
a highly selective basis, and only when there was
no other logical place to make the assignment.
Unless extreme care is exercised, the Bureau may
be placed in a position of a program advocate and a
defender of its own operations, thus compromising
Its objectivity and effectiveness as a protector
of the "Presidency" and a bastion against the
unremitting pressure brought on a President by
representatives of narrow, partisan interests.
The net result of this reorganization must be viewed with
concern for the enduring responsibilities for management
improvement held by the Bureau of the Budget. Brundage,
himself a Director of the Bureau of the Budget from 1956-1958,
has these comments:
In its present stage of development, under
the concepts of the 1967 reorganization, it can
only be concluded that the Bureau, as the management
arm of the President, has not been performing a
service commensurate with the management
responsibilities set forth in the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921 and the Budget and
Accounting Procedures Act of 1950. This leads to
the question as to whether the management function
now vested in the Bureau could be performed more
effectively in a separate office in the Executive
Office of the President. It is a question about
^Particularly relevant is the Preface to "The Work of
the Steering Group" and pp. 1-5, 1-9 and 1-13 through 15.
2Seidman, Politics, p. 77.
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which differences of opinion exist. . . .
My own suggestion has been to establish
eventually a statutory second deputy director
within the Bureau of the Budget, to be appointed
by the President and to give his whole time to
management and organization. . . .*




The work of the Ash Council had Its foundation in the
1968 Presidential campaign. The issue of Government reform
had been raised, and, shortly after his election, President
Nixon took steps to implement his promises. During the pre-
inaugural days at Nixon headquarters in New York City's Hotel
Pierre, Litton Industries President Roy L. Ash was an advisor
to the President-elect and was asked to begin preliminary work
in the area of government reorganization. At the same time,
a special task force headed by Franklin Lindsay of the Itek
Corporation undertook a study of executive branch structure.
This group recommended, among other things, that a formal group
be convened when the Administration took office to study
government structure. Despite Nixon's desire to develop
reorganization plans in time to be implemented soon after his
inauguration on January 20, 1969, time and legal constraints
precluded completion of such an ambitious project. Newly
designated Cabinet and sub-Cabinet officers were, however,
cautioned to expect substantial reorganizations early in the
Administration's tenure.
Although the original timing of Nixon's intent was
overly optimistic, the project was not neglected, and in




formal and structured fashion. The decision to form a five-
man advisory council paralleling the President's Advisory
Council on Government Organization, which had operated during
the Eisenhower Administration, was made by Ash and approved by
the President. The announcement of the formation of the
President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization (Ash
Council) was made on April 4, 1969.
In addition to Ash as the designated Chairman, the
following were named to the Council: George P. Baker—former
Dean, Harvard University Graduate School of Business
Administration; John B. Connally—former Secretary of the Navy
and Governor of Texas, then a partner in the Houston law firm
of Vinson, Elkins, Searles and Connally; Fredrick R. Kappel
—
retired Chairman of the Executive Committee, American Telephone
and Telegraph Corporation, and Chairman of the Commission on
Postal Organization (1968); and Richard Paget—President,
Cresap, McCormick and Paget. By the end of April it was decided
that the present council members were unable to devote
sufficient time in Washington to organize the staff and get the
operation underway. It was for this purpose that Walter N.
Thayer, President of Whitney Communications Corporation, was
appointed to the Ash Council on June 2, 1969, although he had
begun work earlier.
The top-level staff of the Ash Council was selected in
June 1969. Murray Comarow of Booze, Allen and Hamilton, Inc.,
Bertram Harding of Fry Consultants, and Andrew M. Rouse were
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asked to join the staff. 1 Oomarow agreed to accept the
position of Executive Director and to serve for one year.
Rouse accepted the position of Deputy Executive Director and
succeeded to the Executive Director position when Comarow
resigned on July 18, 1970.
The President gave the Ash Council a broad charter to
examine ways in which the Executive Branch could be better
organized. 2 The Ash Council was expected to give over-all and
specific recommendations for improved effectiveness and to deal
with immediate and long-range needs of organizational change to
make the Executive Branch a more effective instrument of public
policy. Specifically the Ash Council was given the mandate to
consider: (1) the organization of the Executive 3ranch in
terms of today's changing requirements of government, (2)
solutions to organizational problems arising among the numerous
Executive organization units, and (3) relationship of the
Federal Government to states and cities involved with the many
domestic programs.
In its first meeting on April 10, 1969, early
discussions centered on the specific tasks to be undertaken.
'Comarow was formerly Executive Director of the
Federal Power Commission, and Hardy had been acting Director
of the Office of Economic Opportunity. Rouse was Director of
the Bureau of the Budget's resources planning staff.
2U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Government
Operations, Reorganization Plan, No. 2 of 1970, Hearing;,,
before the Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization and
Government Research of the Committee on Government Operations,
United States Senate, 91st Cong., 2d sess., 1970, p. 72.
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It was decided that a list of prospective subjects would be
prepared for consideration at a May meeting. No decisions on
studies were made in the Ash Council's first meeting with the
President on April 29, 1969. The work of the council was
discussed only in general terms at this time. From the list
of nearly 100 potential subjects submitted by members at a
two-day meeting in Washingtoii on May 16-17, 1969, ten were
selected for prime consideration. These were: (1) social
programs; (2) international economic affairs; (3) science
functions of the President's Office; (4) Commerce Department;
(5) Office of Emergency Preparedness; (6) inter-agency
coordinating relationships; (7) independent regulatory agencies;
(8) information systems (Bureau of the Budget); (9) President's
Office; and (10) recruiting, evaluating, transfer and promotion
of top personnel. Law enforcement, and environmental
improvement and control were also noted for further consider-
ation. Member consideration of these items as well as staff,
space and equipment considerations occupied the Ash Council
through June. By mid-July the Ash Council had begun to focus
on priorities. In a meeting with the President on July 14,
1969, it was agreed that the study of the Executive Office of
the President itself should receive the highest possible
priority. Three other subjects were also selected for
immediate consideration: (1) executive personnel, (2)
organized crime (Justice Department-Treasury Department
organization), and (3) social programs.
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Meeting on July 17-19, 1969, the Ash Council decided
that studies would be better handled internally as opposed to
securing the assistance of personnel from other agencies.
This would require a larger staff than originally intended1
but would tend to speed up the operation and provide an extra
safeguard against the risk of premature disclosure. Coimally
and Paget were assigned supervisory responsibility for the
social programs study; Kappel, the personnel study; and Thayer,
the organized crime study. The study of the Executive Office
of the President, the reason for the creation of the Ash
Council itself, was to be the responsibility of the Council as
a whole. Ash's earlier work became the foundation of this
portion of their effort. During this meeting, the Ash Council
and staff also met with several high-ranking members of the
Administration, including Attorney General John N. Mitchell;
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Robert N. Pinch;
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development George Romney;
Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity Donald Rumsfield;
Director of the Bureau of the Budget Robert Mayo; Presidential
Assistant John Ehrlichman; and Counselor to the President
Daniel P. Moynihan.
Time frames for the study of the Executive Office of
the President were established and the President was informed
that first recommendations on the structure of the Executive
Office would be made at a projected August meeting. The




remainder of July was primarily devoted to interviewing
approximately 200 authorities on the subject of the Executive
Office of the President. Former President Johnson, former and
present White House aides, and academic scholars in the field
of Government organization were included. From Ash's earlier
work, the contributions of those interviewed, and the
discussions of the members of the Ash Council, the staff began
preparation of the recommendations. Ash, Thayer, Kappel, and
Paget met in Washington on August 7 to discuss progress and to
obtain advice from selected consultants. The report was
perfected at a later three-day meeting (August 17-19) in Los
Angeles. A total of eleven drafts were prepared before the
paper was considered ready for presentation to the President.
The Ash Council presented the result to the President on
August 20, 1969, in a meeting which included White House aides
Haldeman, jShrlichman, Flanigan, and Kissinger. The concept
was approved in principle, and the Ash Council was requested
to continue to develop the proposed structure. Ash and Rouse
met with Presidential aides Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Flanigan
again on August 28 to further discuss the recommendations.
Ash, Baker, Rouse, and other staff members met again on
September 5» and at this stage began to examine the issues in
depth. Implementation strategies also began to receive
attention.
The developing line of thought was subsequently
disclosed in Congressional testimony. While budgeting was
acknowledged as the pre-eminent managerial technique available
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when the Bureau of the Budget was established in 1921,
significant changes were recognized.
. . .
But since that time, management science
has experienced an enormous growth. Powerful new
tools of management have been developed, many of
them first explored by the Government itself.
Along with growth of management techniques
has come an equally striking change in the demands
upon the executive branch and Congress. The
Government now provides many more complicated
services than ever before.
. . .
In other words, the budget function is now
only one of several important tools that the
President must have to manage both foreign and
domestic affairs. The proposed allocation of




The Ash Council identified six major management processes which
should be included within the Executive Office of the President
and in which were found significant organizational inadequacies
(1) policy and program development, (2) recognition of the
organizational and management implications inherent to program
decisions, (3) program evaluation, (4) creation of an
information system, (5) resolution of interagency problems of
coordination, and (6) executive career personnel development.
Having isolated these functions to be
strengthened, our Council went about designing the
best structure we could to enhance these functions.
During our discussions, we selected certain key
criteria on which we based our final organizational
recommendations: (l) No activity should be placed
within the .Sxecutive Office of the President
without compelling reasons for it being there.
Activities which can be well handled elsewhere in
the executive branch should not end up in the
President's Office by default. (2) Insofar as
possible, the powers of organizations lodged within
the President's Office should be vested in the
3-House Hearings, Reorganization Plan No. 2 . p. 12.
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President. (3) Operating activities or others
involving large numbers of personnel are
generally not suitable for placement in the
Executive Office. (4) The role of agency heads
needs to be strengthened, not further reduced,
and means must be sought to insure they remain
responsive to the Presidential needs. (5)
Legislative recommendations should not be overly
detailed about the structure of new organizations.
It is important to clearly outline the major
functions to be performed and their relationships.
Detailed organization charts, job descriptions,
and the like are matters we believe which should
be left to the particular individuals heading the
organizations and their key executives at any
given time. 3-
Two major organizational strategy questions were
discussed by the Ash Council at length:
(1) Should the President's staff functions
for policy and program formulation be separated
from those for program implementation and
administration?
(2) Should the non-budgetary management
activities (other than policy and program
formulation) be set up in a separate organization
or combined with budgeting activities?
In the case of the first question, the Ash Council decided that
since "policy and program development should work with a longer
time horizon and be less subject to day-to-day pressures," two
different organizations were desirable. In the second, the
Ash Council found:
The case for separation depends upon the
different skills and perspectives required by the
two sets of activities. Moreover, budgeting
activities often seem to drive out non-budgetary
activities.
. . . Our council recommended not setting up
two organizations. We do believe, however, that
special encouragement must be given to the non-
budgetary management processes so that they may
operate effectively side by side with the
budgetary duties in the Office of Management and
Budget.
1 Ibid.. pp. 8-9.
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The budgetary and non-budgetary activities
are intimately related and integral parts of
putting programs into action. ...
Conversely, separation would tend to distort
the integral nature of the budgetary and non-
budgetary activities, and perhaps even foster
needless competition between them. Furthermore,
a separate organization would require. another
executive reporting to the President. 1
These issues were discussed at an Ash Council meeting
September 18-19, 1959, after which the staff prepared drafts
of the final proposal. Once the drafts had been reviewed,
Council members telephoned their comments to the staff in
Washington for inclusion in the final revision. By September 24,
the basic concepts approved by the President in August had been
expanded and fleshed out. Attention was then given to serious
consideration of implementation strategies. On October 17, 1969,
the final proposals for the new structure of the Executive
Office of the President were sent to the President.
Preliminary plans for implementation of the recommendations
were included.
The Ash Council had once again reaffirmed the role of
the budgetary agency's management function. The problematic
nature of the issues which had confronted the Ash Council Is
indicated by Ash's testimony in support of Reorganization Plan
No. 2:
. . . Almost every past President in this century
has commented that resistance to organizational
change is one of the chief obstacles to effective
government and that better means are needed to insure
that organization keep abreast of program needs. . . .
^Senate Hearings, Reorganization Plan No. 2. p. 73.
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Sound management structures are no guarantee
of good program results. The new structures
recommended in Reorganization Plan No. 2 can only
pave the way for needed change. Ultimately
success in managing the executive branch of
Government comes down to people-- their abilities
and attitudes. . . .
. . . There is no precise, clean way to split
up the duties of the President, yet split them he
must. Cooperation and men of good spirit must
bridge the gaps.
We do not claim that what we have is
exceedingly novel or new. It is, more than
anything, a distillation and synthesis of the
thinking that we came to know by our research,
brought up to date, of course, by our own thinking
in terms of today's government in contrast to some
of the issues that were faced by those earlier
administrations.^-
Except for specifying that the policy and program
formulation should belong to the new Domestic Council, the Ash
Council recommendations, which became the basis for Reorganiza-
tion Plan No. 2 of 1970, were in close harmony with the
findings of "past studies. Not only did the Second Hoover
Commission Task Force recommend changing the name of the Bureau
of the Budget to "Office of Budget and Executive Management,"
but a statement by Dwight A. Ink, Assistant Director for
Executive Management of the Bureau of the Budget, indicates
that another similar proposal existed. "The Rockefeller
Committee's recommendations led President Eisenhower to propose
the establishment of an Office of Executive Management to be
inclusive of the budget function, with heavy emphasis on
House Hearings, Reorganization Plan No . 2, pp. 12~l6.
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program coordination activities.' Further, it is reported
that the Ash Council had knowledge that President Roosevelt
intended to set up an organization roughly similar to the
Office of Management and Budget, but that World War II side-
tracked the plan.
^
On October 22, 1969, the Ash Council met with the
President to discuss the recommendations. The decision to
proceed with plans for implementation was made at that time.
The details of the recommendations were still closely held and
their nature was known only to a few. During subsequent
months, the Ash Council continued to be closely associated with
the implementation planning. In addition to the Ash Council
and its staff, Presidential Assistant fihrlichman, Counselors
Harlow and Moynihan, and Director of the Bureau of the Budget
Mayo were Involved with the planning of the proposed change.
By mid-December, Mayo believed that it was then necessary to
disclose the nature of the plans to his appointed assistant
directors (Ink, Schlesinger, Mann, Nathan) and Rodger Jones.
5
On the issue of the Director of the Office of Executive
2Chamber of Commerce of the United States. "How the
White House Got its New Management Tools," Na tion s Business,,
LVIII (August, 1970), p. 46.
^Rodger Jones had retired from the Bureau of the Budget
in 1968, but had returned to assist the new administration
with the status of an Assistant Director.
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Management's membership on the proposed Domestic Council,
Mayo was strongly in favor of the Director being a designated
member of the Domestic Council. He believed that Congress
would consider the omission inconsistent with the stated
objective of upgrading the Office of Executive Management
function. The Ash Council, however, believed that the Director
of the Office of Executive Management should not want to be a
member of the Domestic Council in order to maintain and
enhance his role as an objective Presidential Advisor; that
once in the Domestic Council, he would become only one of many.
This latter view was to prevail, at least for a time. Although
Mayo strongly supported an improved and strengthened
institutional management capability for the President, he
raised doubts as to the strategy of implementation.
The main issue was that the President could establish
the Cabinet-level council and order a revitalized Bureau of
the Budget to proceed with its management functions by
executive action. Proceeding in this manner, however, would
require abandonment of a number of ends advocated by the Ash
Council, including: (1) statutory authorization of the
Cabinet-level council; (2) the first step toward authority for
the President to organize the Executive Office as he desired,
^The Ash Council's recommended name for the successor
to the Bureau of the Budget was "Office of Executive Manage-
ment." This was changed to "Office of Management and Budget"
only in the final stages when liaison with Congressional




brought about by transfer to the President for subsequent
delegation of present statutory authorities vested in the
Bureau of the Budget or its Director; (3) statutory identifica-
tion of the management function in the context of development
and execution of policy and programs rather than in the
context of budget formulation and execution; and (4) provision
of new executive level positions by adding a number of
executive positions within the civil service system. Mayo
generally favored these goals, but cautioned that Executive-
Legislative relations were not such as to insure passage of a
reorganization plan. The issues raised were such that doubt
was created as to the advisability of proceeding on the charted
course.
Harold Seidman, consultant to the Ash Council, had
already begun drafting the reorganization plan, although it was
not until February 7, 1970, that Ash was informed that the
President had resolved to proceed as recommended by the Ash
Council, despite potential problems with Congress. Intense
briefings of Congressional leaders, Cabinet and sub-Cabinet
officials, and selected members of the press began. It was
hoped that careful a/id complete briefing would help overcome
the opposition which was anticipated.
Assistant Director, Office of Management and
Organization from 1964 to 1968; subsequently 3cholar-in-




The Ash Council plan was designed to be the first in a
series of moves to develop a broader managerial base for the
executive branch in contrast to what had become a gradual
accumulation of too much authority and responsibility for too
many matters that could well be located in the departmental
structure. 1 The major features of the plan were:
(l) The redes ignation of the Bureau of the
Budget as the Office of Management and Budget with
additional high level positions and other personnel;
and (2) the creation of a Cabinet-level Domestic
Counc11—presumably a counterpart to the National
Security Council. The Domestic Council will have a
staff to be directed by a White House assistant. 2
House Hearings, Reorganization,, Plan No
.
, 2. p. 62.
2 Ibid . . p. 1.

CHAPTER IV
THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Re organlza t lo n_.Plan ^No_iL_._2.._o_f_JL9.7.Q
President Nixon submitted Reorganization Plan No. 2 of
1970 (see Appendix E) to the Congress on March 12, 1970.
Unless Congress rejected the plan by May 16, 1970, it was to
become effective on July 1, 1970. In his letter of transmittal,
President Nixon noted that the plan recognized two closely
connected, but basically separate functions of the President's
Office; policy determination and executive management. "This
involves (1) what the government should do, and (2) how it
goes about doing it." He characterized the new Domestic
Council as being "primarily concerned with what, we do, " and
the Office of Management and Budget as being "primarily
concerned with how we do it, and how well we do it."
Creation of the Office of Management and Budget
represents far more than a mere change of name for
the Bureau of the Budget. It represents a basic
change in concept and emphasis, reflecting the
broader management needs of the Office of the
President.
• . . But preparation of the budget as such
will no longer be its dominant, overriding concern.
While the budget function remains a vital tool
of management, it will be strengthened by the great
emphasis the new office will place on fiscal
analysis. The budget function is only one of
several important management tools that the
President must now have. He must also have a
substantially enhanced institutional staff
capability in other areas of executive management—




improvement of Executive Branch organization,
information and management systems, and
development of executive talent. . . .
Improvement of Government organization,
information and management systems will be a
major function of the Office of Management and
Budget. . . . Resistance to organizational
change is one of the chief obstacles to effective
government; the new Office will seek to ensure
that organization keeps abreast of program needs.
The new Office will also take the lead in
devising programs for the development of career
executive talent throughout the Government. . . .
President Mxon stated that he expected to follow with
additional reorganization plans, but noted that "... this by
Itself is a reorganization of major significance, and a key to
the more effective functioning of the Executive Branch.'
Reorganization Plan L7o. 2 of 1970 provided for: (1)
transfer to the President of all functions vested by law in
the Bureau of the Budget or its Director, (2) redesignating
the Bureau of the Budget as the Office of Management and
Budget with six additional level V officers, and (3) establish-
ment of a Domestic Council. The duties of the Office of
Management and Budget and the Domestic Council, although
described in Congressional testimony, were left to the
direction of the President and were not specifically outlined
by the plan. The new level V positions to be located in the
Office of Management and Budget were not specified, their
duties and titles left to the discretion of the Director of the




considered organizational alternatives to be applied to the
new Office of Management and Budget, the organization chart
presented by Ink in the Congressional Hearings (see Appendix
F) was primarily the work of the Bureau of the Budget staff.
The Ash Council had originally recommended additional high-
level grades for the Office of Management and Budget. Since
this recommendation would have placed the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget at Cabinet rank (level I),
only the six level V positions were retained in the final plan
to reduce possible opposition. The membership of the Domestic
Council was specified, but the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget was not included, although the President
was given authority to designate additional officers of the
Executive Branch if he so desired.
Opposition to Reorganization Plan No. 2 was led by
Representative Chet Holifield, ranking majority member of the
Committee on Government Operations. Opposition comments were
primarily directed to concerns that: (1) the Domestic Council
constituted a layer to function between the President and the
Office of Management and Budget as well as his Cabinet Officers,
(2) this layer was insulated from Congressional influence,
(3) the position of the Office of Management and Budget was
Holifield was a member of the Second Hoover Commission
and is coiisidered one of the authorities in Congress on
Government reorganization. Dom Bonafede, "Lobbying Brings
Last-minute Victory for Nixon's Reorganization Plan," National
Journal. II (May 16, 1970), 1018.
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being downgraded, (4) transfer to the President of the functions
vested by law in the Bureau of the Budget, in conjunction with
the failure of the plan to be specific as to the redelegation
of these functions, could be utilized to nullify some of the
statutory provisions of Congress, and (5) the Plan downgrades
other executive offices such as the Council of Economic
Advisors, The Office of Science and Technology, and the Civil
Service Commission. Additionally, there was a feeling that the
plan identified an unreal distinction between the Office of
Management and Budget and the Domestic Council as policy-making
organizations. Concern was also expressed that the plan did
not spell out in sufficient detail the organization which was
to result.
Throughout the House Hearings, the thread of concern
over a possible reduction in Congressional influence and control
is evident. The possible effects of the Domestic Council
becoming a layer between the President and the Office of
Management and Budget were brought up repeatedly. The
following exchange is representative:
Mr. Hollfield: ... So I think we pretty well
established the fact that we are creating a political
level between the Budget Bureau and the President,
one that is inaccessible to the Congress.
Mr. Ink: We do not look upon this as creating
a layer between the Bureau and the President. The
new Office of Management and Budget will continue to
have responsibility for the budget and will continue
to report directly to the President. . . .1
^House Hearings, Reorganization Plan No. 2 , pp. 82-83.
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This opposition viewpoint was persistent in the face of strong
denials by the proponents of the plan. Ash had previously
responded to a similar question by stating: "We had hoped that
we had made it clear, but apparently we did not, that the
Domestic Council will not be a layer between the Office of
Management and Budget and the President." While concern for
maintaining the status of the Office of Management and Budget
was real enough, the possibility of the new arrangement
impinging on Congressional prerogatives was consistently in the
background.
This was even more evident in opposition to transfer to
the President of the powers vested by law in the Bureau of the
Budget.
Now this flexibility, which is in the plan and
which places all of these powers in the hands of
the President with the privilege of delegation or
assignment wherever he chooses, in effect nullifies
in many instances the intent of Congress in setting
up those statutes.
2
And again, "One of the things I have been worried about is
weakening of the Budget Bureau, partlcularily in regard to these
statutes that pertain to the Budget Bureau functions which have
been placed there by various arms of the Congress. "3 In
response, Ash reiterated the Council's criteria that an




3 Ibid ., p. 35.
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and that a reorganization should not be so detailed that it
limits future alternatives. He stated that the recommendations
were in no way intended to diminish Congressional access to
Information. 3- It was further pointed out that the President
had indicated, in his letter of transmittal, the intent to
redelegate the functions transferred to him back to the Office
of Management and Budget. The point, however, was that the
President could at some future time redelegate these functions
as he chose without consulting Congress. This was one of the
objectives of the Ash Council.
Responding to the view that the proposed reorganization
would downgrade agencies not designated specifically as members
of the Domestic Council, Ash stated:
... We feel that the Office of Management
and Budget and CEA and the 08T each have Independent
status and each have their relationships with the
President independent from the Council and felt it
should not be subordinated by their being one of
the many members of the Council, and that the
President should view them not so much as one among
the many that make the Council, but that he should
seek from each of them their professional expertise,
their direct communication with them.
2
In response to questions of encroaching on the territory of the
Civil Service Commission, Ash stated that Reorganization Plan
No. 2 had been discussed with them and that they had found it
acceptable.
1 Ibid., pp. 18, 21.




Concern as to the distinctions drawn between the policy-
roles of the Office of Management and Budget and the Domestic
Council were answered to the effect that this was a formaliza-
tion of separations of function which were informally and
indistinctly being made at the present time. It was pointed
out that institutionalizing the process would make more coherent
policy planning possible and that records and staff of the
Domestic Council would help bridge the gap between administra-
tions. A statement made by Mayo at the March 12, 1970, White
House Press Conference was used in part to substantiate the
opposition position in this regard. The validity of the
opposition remarks had been acknowledged by Ash earlier in his
opening statement when he stated that there was "no precise,
clean way to split up the duties of the President, yet split
them he must.
Mayo's earlier identification of points potentially
vulnerable to criticism was proving accurate. Another of these
points arose when the opposition questioned the necessity of a
reorganization plan to accomplish the recommendations of the
Ash Council. Among other answers to this point, Dwlght A. Ink^
pointed out that the name of the Bureau of the Budget could not




2 lb id . , p. 14.
3lnk then held the position of Assistant Director for




Having tried to do a management job
within the framework of the Bureau of the Budget
I am constantly having to defend and explain why
I am concerned with something other than cutting
the budget. I think it is important to get away
from the connotation of an agency dealing simply
with the budget if we are going to permit this
organization to do what I think really the Budget
and Accounting Act contemplated for us in the
first place. 3-
The Senate Hearings on Reorganization Plan Ho. 2
covered much the same ground as did the House, but opposition
was not as pronounced. No action was taken to disapprove the
plan by the Senate. The House Committee on Government
Operations, however, submitted an unfavorable report
accompanying a resolution (H. Res. 960) to disapprove
Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1970. Since the Congress had no
authority to amend or modify a reorganization plan, the proposal
was to disapprove the plan and subsequently introduce a bill to
enact provisions of the plan which were considered sound.
^
Despite the fact that the opposition was aided by
reaction against the President's decision of April 30, 1970, to
send troops into Cambodia, the resolution (H. Res. 960) to
disapprove the plan was not successful. On May 13, 1970, the
resolution failed by a roll-call vote 163-193 after three hours
of debate. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1970 had, in effect,
received Congressional approval and would become effective on
^•House Hearings, Reorganization Plan, No. 2. p. 65.
2u.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government
Opera tlons , Msa^groxingReorqanlzatlon Plan No
j
U^2-of-1i§Z2jL
Repor t, Report No. 91-106T"To accompany H.Rl 960, 91st Cong.,
2d sess., 1970, pp. 1-3.
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July 1, 1970. x
Implementation
The President announced on June 10, 1970, that George
P. Shultz, then Secretary of Labor, would become Director of
the new Office of Management and Budget when Reorganization
Plan No. 2 became effective. 2 Shultz took over as the first
Director of the Office of Management and Budget on July 1,
1970. By August 6, 1970, the organization of the new Office
had been determined and distributed to the staff (see Appendix
G). The management side of the organization was much the same
as had been presented to Congress (Appendix P), but a new
position—-Associate Director~-had been added to head up that
effort. Shultz brought Arnold R. Weber with him from the
Labor Department to fill this new post.^ The budget side of
the house was significantly modified by the introduction of
four new politically appointed Assistant Directors to oversee
the operation of the program Divisions. This was done to
^-Bonafede, "Lobbying Brings Victory," 1018-1020.
2Dom Bonafede, "White House Report/The Making of the
President's Budget: Politics and Influence in a New Manner,
"
National Journal. Ill (January 23, 1971), 151
•
5u.S., Office of Management and Budget, "Office
Memorandum No. 71-7 (Unpublished paper, August 6, 1970,
Washington, D.O.).
^Charles P. Parker, Assistant to the Assistant Director
for Executive Development and Labor Relations, Office of
Management and Budget, in a private interview at his office,
Washington, D.C., March 15, 1971. Parker was Assistant to the
Assistant Director of the Office of Executive Management at
the time of the reorganization.
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Insure that implementation of policy in the budget process
would be more responsive to the President. The Deputy
Director who was responsible for putting the budget together
could now look to five Assistant Directors to carry out his
direction, while the Director had only to look to the Deputy
and Associate Directors. Before, the Director and Deputy
Director were required to deal with eight Assistant Directors
or Office heads and five Division heads (Appendix D).
This new arrangement at the top level had much in its
favor. First, the span of control vras reduced from what had
been in theory a highly undesirable situation with thirteen
unit heads reporting to the Deputy Director and Director. Now
only two positions report to the Director, each of which have
only five positions reporting in turn to them. The Director,
Deputy Director and Associate Director have established a very
close working relationship and have become widely known in the
Office of Management and Budget as the "Troika." Second, the
management side of the organization has gained a top-level
spokesman who can represent the management interests better
than the five independent Assistant Directors each reporting
to the Director. The Associate Director has more time to devote
•''Ibid..
^This term was used by Weber in Congressional testimony.
U.S., Congr ess, S e na te , Supplemental Appropriations for_Flscal
lM^^J-SJ2t^.33^£lBS^,f before the Committeemen Appropriations,
United States Senate, on H.R. 19928, 91st Cong.', 2d sess., 1970,
p. 462. YJide use of the term wa3 reflected by Baldwin and
confirmed by Parker. Parker additionally indicated that the
relationship had become so close that the Deputy and Associate
Directors were operating as alter egos of the Director.
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to the management effort and, In addition to better
coordination, can help insure that the budget activities do
not become dominant over the non~budget activities. Finally,
the introduction of politically responsive supervision of the
budget divisions will insure better response to higher level
policy determination. The result of this latter change is
reported to be a significant influence on the budget process
in that the traditional understandings between the professional
budget examiners and the agency budget staffs has, in part,
been disrupted. This has created some dissatisfaction among
the professional budget examiners who must now contend with
more decisions made between the Assistant Directors and agency
heads.
1
The major proposals of the Ash Council as reflected in
Reorganisation Plan No. 2 were implemented within about five
weeks after the "troika" took office. 2 By November, an
additional seventy- two positions needed to give effect to the
proposals had been identified and presented to Congress (see
Appendixes H and I). Congress was told that implementation of
Reorganization Plan No. 2 was proceeding and that new emphasis
was being placed on the new management responsibilities. Of
the seventy-two requested positions, forty-four were intended
Bonafede, "Influence in a New Manner, " 151-165.
2U.S., Congress, House, Sj^&lj^f^
12Z1j^Jjgarin gs. , before Subcommittees' of the Committee on




to staff the areas of program coordination, program evaluation,
government organization and management, executive development
and labor relations, statistical policy and management
information systems, and legislative reference. Twelve
positions were for additional executive direction and
administrative support requirements. The sixteen remaining
positions were for program and budget divisions
.
The implementation design was intended to provide a
means for working "in an integrated way to bring management
concepts into the preparation of the budget and vice versa."
Weinberger2 stated that
It is through the program divisions with their
day-to-day contacts in the departments and agencies
that we intend to disseminate and implement the
necessary managerial changes that will logically
follow from our effort to implement fully the
President's desire to make the Federal bureaucracy
more responsive and effective.
An Evaluation Division was being added to the budget side for
the purpose of looking at existing program operation and to
make suggestions as to which could be terminated or curtailed.
It would also propose new programs that should be initiated.
In support of the additional budget positions, it was stated
that it would be necessary to draw on people who are familiar
with the budget examining functions to provide certain desired
management information.
3
^Senate Supplemental Hearing, p. 460.
^Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget.
3Senate Supplemental Hearing, pp. 460-461.
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Thirty-two of the requested positions were slated for
three new Divisions on the management side: Program Coordina-
tion Division, fifteen positions; Organization and Management
Systems Division, nine positions; and the Statistical Policy
and Management Information Systems Division, eight positions.
The depth of the new management effort is reflected in the
justification for these increases:
Systems and procedures never work precisely as
they are designed. . . . There are opportunities
to clear up interagency and intergovernmental
bottlenecks, but we do not novr have the machinery
with which to meet these problems effectively.
The program coordination activity will focus on the
shorter range operational kinds of problems which
plague the delivery systems of the Federal
assistance programs. Based in Washington but
active in the field, staff will give a helping hand
to assist agencies to clear up bottlenecks.
Without policy, program or supervisory authority,
it serves as an expeditor, not as an enforcer.
Will give greater attention to modernizing
organization and management systems. 0MB will
provide strong leadership in interagency efforts to
streamline processes and to cut unnecessary paper-
work and reporting. Additional personnel will also
pave the way for addressing important management
areas which in the past have had little systematic
attention in the Executive Office of the President
such as contract practices, inadequacies of many
audit programs, and in modernizing agency
accounting systems to meet the standards established
by the GAO.
MgjPa^ejnejL^^jLQ^.mjAlpp,, Sys terns,
Efficient and effective management of Government
programs is dependent upon a flow of accurate,
relevant and timely information to support decision-
making at all levels of management in both the
executive and legislative branches. Information is
needed to evaluate alternative programs and for judiciously
selecting and funding those which offer the greatest
potential contribution to national priorities and goals.
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Information is also needed to evaluate on»going
prograras to determine "how well" these programs are
being implemented and managed and whether they are
achieving intended results. Up to this time, the
major portion of the Office's management information
system development activities has been devoted to
development of systems to support preparation and
publication of the President s budget and only
minimal resources have been available for other
important information systems development activities.
This new effort would focus in areas such as the
development of systems to provide periodic reports
of program accomplishments and costs against goals,
objectives and plans; to provide the President
early warning of potential problems; to support
evaluation, consolidation, simplification, and
management of Federal Grant programs; and to support
management of Federal programs at the local level.
It would also emphasize improved policies to assure
better management of information system development
efforts undertaken by various departments and agencies
to assure that these efforts are properly coordinated,
do not impose undue burden on the public, and are
compatible with State and local development efforts. 3-
Although the Office of Management and Budget had begun
recruitment action prior to Congressional approval, finding the
right people was expected to take time. 2 Moreover, time will
be required to develop and mold the new organizations into
effective management tools.
Testimony in support of the supplemental appropriation
request revealed that the President had designated the Director
and Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the
Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, and the
Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors to membership on
1Ibid,«» pp. 473-474.
2Velma Baldwin, Assistant to the Director for
Administration, Office of Management and Budget, in a private
interview in her office, Washington, D.C., January 21, 1971.
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the Domestic Council in addition to those members specified by-
Reorganization Plan No. 2. Whatever the reason, opponents of
the reorganization have been denied opportunity for further
criticism on this point.
It novr appears that the Office of Management and
Budget has gained significantly in power and influence. What
is not clear, however, is the reason. Shultz apparently
enjoys a rare working relationship with President Nixon and
has become one of the President's most trusted advisors.
Shultz f s office is not physically located in the Executive
Office Building with the rest of the Office of Management and
Budget, but was moved to the White House at the President's
request. Here, Shultz and Ehrlichman have almost daily
meetings with the President. Shultz 's influence, however,
appears to transcend that which would normally accrue just
from position. As a result, it is impossible to evaluate
just how much of the Office of Management and Budget's new
power stems from its revitalized organization or from Shultz'
s
intimate relationship with the President.
^Senate Supplemental Hearing, p. 457.
2Shultz's rapid rise is currently being widely
reported. See Bonafede, "Influence in a New Manner,' 1 151;
Irwin Ross, "George Shultz: Strong Right Arm of the
Presidency," Re^d^s_Di^est, March, 1971, pp. 143-147; an<i
"The Architect of Nixon'sNew Economics, Business Week.
March 20, 1971, pp. 72-75.
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Whatever the reason, the management activities of the
Office of Management and Budget are actively pursuing their
responsibilities. It appears that the management function
has at last found a home where it is vielcome, and it stands
a good chance of reaching maturity in this environment.
^-Charles P. Parker, Assistant to the Assistant Director
for Executive Development and Labor Relations, Office of
Management and Budget, in a private interview in his office,





Throughout its history, the Bureau of the Budget has
given the appearance of generally avoiding the broad
responsibilities for management improvement which seemingly
were intended for it to accomplish. Each succeeding study has
indicated that the Bureau had not fulfilled the expected
management function. And yet, it seems strange that such a
prestigious agency, with its great power and talent, would be
so consistently off the expected mark.
The matter of a name seems of little consequence so
close to the seat of power, but could well have been a factor.
Ink's testimony in support of Reorganization Plan Ho. 2 would
indicate that the matter of a name does indeed make a
difference. This view is held by others who have worked in
the Bureau of the Budget. Further, a name change was
advocated by the Second Hoover Commission Task Force, and,
although it never reached the status of a recommendation, this
suggestion was acknowledged in the final report. Apparently
the Rockefeller Commission also thought a name change to be in




order, although little more can be ascertained from the brief
reference previously cited. A more descriptive name might
have helped those in the Bureau, the other agencies, and even
Tresidents to better understand and use the authority vested
in the Bureau of the Budget. But while this might have been
particularly helpful in recent years, the early history of the
Bureau would imply that until 1939* no real attempt was made to
exercise the management function.
It is perhaps unfortunate that the initiative was not
seized in those early years. While it may have been too large
a chunk for the new organization to assimilate all at once,
early establishment of its prerogatives in this area could have
made a significant difference. The difficulties in bringing
about a change at a later date have been noted by Seldman:
Once systems are developed and patterns of
organization behavior are established, in most
instances, they cannot be altered significantly
by interdepartmental reorganizations. . . .
Reorganizations may result in scarcely more than
a new name on the letterhead. . . .
The behavior of adult institutions can be
changed. But this requires nonorganizational
measures which enlarge the agency s constituency,
compel redesign of the administrative system,
and call for a different mix of professional
skills. . . .-1-
The inertia which set in when Dawes was forced to allow the
management function to slip past, became so great that the
determined efforts of Smith and Stone after the 1939
reorganization could gain only partial success. What little
^-Seidman, Politics, p. 133.
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momentum was achieved was unable to sustain itself. Later
attempts to move the Bureau of the Budget off its accustomed
mark had to contend with an increasingly complex environment
as well as a larger, stronger, and more entrenched bureaucracy.
It may be significant that most of Seidman f s career has been
spent with the Bureau of the Budget, for, although he was not
making direct reference to the Bureau, it does offer a prime
example of his point. There is a tendency for bureaucracy as
well as people to do what it knows-~and others are not apt to
object, for this is all they expect.
It has been suggested that part of the difficulty lies
in the type of men chosen to lead the Bureau of the Budget.
People come to new jobs with certain skills and predilections
already established. Although the men chosen to direct the
Bureau of the Budget could hardly be characterized as men of
narrow scope, they did bring professional inclinations which
would tend to dispose them to certain functions in preference
to others. A review of past Directors would indicate that
there is a degree of substance to this theory (see Appendix J).
Although no attempt has been made to delve into backgrounds in
detail, a brief characterization of their professional back-
grounds would indicate that until 1939 the Directors were men
^-Baldwin Interview, January 21, 1971.
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of military or political/financial backgrounds. Smith, taking
over in 1939 s had a somewhat wider background in public
administration and did much to establish the management
function. Directors subsequent to Smith have, for the most
part, been lawyers, bankers, or economists. This is not to
say that these men were not able administrators or managers,
but to indicate the general way their professional tendencies
would lead. These inclinations could tend to reinforce the
budgetary pressures, leaving the no n-budgetary function
without a strong advocate. When this is added to the
possibility of a misleading name and an already established
routine for the Bureau of the Budget, a significant force
favoring the budgetary activities is readily apparent.
The Bureau of the Budget and its leaders were given
little guidance relative to the management functions expected
by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. Despite indications
that the intent was broader in scope, the words "economy and
efficiency" were too easily Interpreted in the narrow sense.
Once Dawes had allowed the objective of achieving broad reform
to pass, his interpretation became almost synonymous with
parsimony. This established pattern was later to become
reinforced by the Bureau of the Budget's relations with the
House Appropriations Committee which tends to think in terms
of expenditure reduction almost exclusively. Perhaps the
^Seidman includes a similar view within the broader
context of orthodox theory. Seidman, Politics, pp. 3-36.
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narrow view was adequate for the environment of the early-
year o, but as the Federal Government grew, much more was
required. Placed in the context of relevant discussions,
subsequent use of the twin terms of economy and efficiency by
later studies of the Bureau's role clearly implies that their
intended application required more than cost reduction. Still
they appear to have been applied in the restrictive sense.
It was not until the enactment of the Budget and Accounting
Procedures Act of 1950 that the word "management" was
incorporated into the basic mandate on which the Bureau of the
Budget was operating (Appendix A). The Bureau of the Budget,
however, has been served by capable, dedicated people and it
appears unlikely that an issue resting solely on semantics
would long stand. The interpretation of "economy and
efficiency" must therefore be considered more result than
cause.
None of these Issues, however, taken separately or in
combination are adequate to satisfactorily explain the Bureau
of the Budget's apparent failure to live up to its management
responsibilities. They provide insights into the nature of
the problem, but seem inadequate against the power and
generally fine reputation enjoyed by the Bureau. This would
imply that other factors, other considerations not of an
internal organization nature, were present. While the Ash
Council noted that budgeting was the pre-eminent management
tool available to the young Bureau of the Budget, it was by no
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means the only tool. The development of management thought
was already well underway. The works of Frederick \1. Taylor,
Henry L. Gant, Prank and Lillian Gilbreth, Mary Parker Follett,
and George Elton Mayo were established and had formed the
basis for new management trends. Other techniques followed as
the management function became more developed. The point to
ponder is why they were not applied in a more systematic and
comprehensive manner as it would seem was intended. Seldman
suggests that management techniques developed in the private
sector may not be self-sufficient without modification or
adjustment when applied to the public, political sector.
Established organization doctrine, with its
emphasis on structural mechanics, manifests
incomplete understanding of our constitutional
system, institutional behavior, and the tactical
and strategic uses of organization structure as
an instrument of politics, position and power.
Orthodox theories are not so much wrong when applied
to the central issues of executive branch organiza-
tion as largely irrelevant.
1
Should this be true, and Seidman presents an excellent argument
in its support, the total political environment in which the
Bureau of the Budget has operated must be a major factor in
the success or failure of the management function.
Political Perspje^tiye
The political arena presents, if not an hostile
environment, at best a grudgingly neutral environment for the
application of standard managerial philosophies. The President,
1Seidman, Politics, p. 13.
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even assuming a perfectly functioning managerial arm, has not
been free to manage the Executive Branch as he may have wished,
He has consistently been constrained to those channels and
methods allowed to him by a frequently belligerent Congress.
"Congress has been unwilling to give the President a free hand
with respect to the organization of the Executive Office of
the President. "* As a result, the Bureau of the Budget has
had to function in an arena allowing full pi of frequently
contradictory forces, each operating from th established
power bases. This is the design of our cons . itional system
and of Congress in particular. As noted by Seidman, "Economy
and efficiency are demonstrably not the prime purpose of
public administration. . . . The basic issues of Federal
organization and administration relate to power : who shall
control it and to what ends?"2 Furthermore,
. . . What may appear to be structural
eccentricities and anomalies within the executive
branch are often nothing but mirror Images of
jurisdictional conflicts within the Congress.
Congressional organization and executive branch
organization are interrelated and constitute two
halves of a single system.
3
Whether Congress is viewed as an obstruction to
effective administration or as an intricate mechanism for the
resolution of conflicting viewpoints makes little difference.





It exists and its existence must be considered. Congress
functions primarily through the power structure of the
Congressional Committees.
Committee jurisdictions are the most important
single factor influencing program assignments among
executive agencies. Congressional dynamics can be
of equal significance in molding and shaping the
choice of administrative instruments, advisory
arrangements, delegations, and field structure.^-
The difficulties are further amplified to the extent that the
Congressional Committee structure has been singularly resistant
to change
•
There has been no major reform of congressional
committee structure since 1946. In vital areas
programs which have been consolidated or are
effectively coordinated at the executive level
remain fragmented in Congress. Hoped for benefits
are lost when comprehensive and well integrated
plans developed by the executive must be broken up
and considered in separate pieces by the Congress.
2
>/hatever the virtues of the Bureau of the Budget, Congressional
influence has and will play a major role in the struggle for
better ways of managing the Federal Government. The Office of
Management and Budget cannot realistically look for better.
Seidraan goes so far as to state that meaningful improvements
in executive branch organization must ultimately depend on





3 lb id., p. 285.
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Even if Congress could be transformed into some Utopian
standard of excellence, however, the result would still fall
short in terms of managerial effectiveness. Congress has no
monopoly on resistance to change. The Federal bureaucracy is
both a contributor and recipient of the same influences which
characterize Congress. Organizations are created to serve
people and come to depend on their support. These groups
become Jealous of their servants and resist changes which might
even remotely create divided loyalties. The organization and
its constituency have a tendency to become mutually dependent.
New approaches are resisted for no other reason
than that they require major modifications in
existing administrative patterns or complicate
constituency relationships. Clientele«orlented
policies also may be engraved in stone. Devotion
to these "historic" policies endure in the face of
changing circumstances and challenges by Presidents
and prestigious commissions.!
Earlier mention was made of the theory that budgetary
progress in the Bureau of the Budget may have been made at the
expense of the non-budgetary functions due, in part, to the
background and inclinations of the men selected to lead the
Bureau. Seidman believes that each profession will "seek to
mold and shape the decision-making process in accordance with
its own professional standards." 2 As a result, professionalism
becomes yet another force resistant to change and which attempts
to order change to its own rather than purely rational ends.
J-Ibid ., pp. 128-131
2lbid .. p. 121.
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In the face of such pressures, the Bureau of the Budget
has operated sometimes at the very center of the arena and
sometimes as the odd man left out. The Office of Management
and Budget will operate in a similar environment. It seems an
almost thankless task. No rational argument could be expected
to consistently survive under these conditions.
The interplay of competing and often
contradictory political, economic, social, and
regional forces within our constitutional system
and pluralistic society has produced a smorgasbord
of institutional types. . . . Choices from among
this rich assortment are seldom determined by
strict application of established organizational
"principles." Choices are influenced by a complex
of tangible and intangible factors reflecting
divergent views about the proper sphere of
government activity, politics, institutional
folklore, program Importance and status,
visibility, political and administrative autonomy,
and, most important, who should exercise control.
The theoretical arguments frequently have little
relevance to the real issues.!
Prospects
None of the foregoing should be taken to imply that the
cause is hopeless, but rather that the Office of Management and
Budget faces a formidable challenge. It must seek to develop
and apply existing management techniques in the public sector
which are capable of withstanding the conflicting pressures.
The Ash Council recommendations were intended to provide the
President with a more viable organization to accomplish his
managerial responsibilities. The new. Office of Management and
1Ibld .. p. 195.
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Budget was left with a more flexible organization, increased
staffing, and a charter giving greater emphasis to its
management function.
The Office of Management and Budget has a came which
clearly reflects its management responsibilities. Members of
the staff previously with the Bureau of the Budget, personnel
of the agencies it seeks to assist, as well as the President
and Congress should now be aware of the broad scope of its
activities. Internal adjustments in organization and staff
have been made to allow the budgetary and non-budgetary
functions to exist in a mutually supportive way while reducing
the possibility that the non-budgetary functions will be
subordinated to the pressures of daily routine. It is to be
hoped that the shake-up caused by the reorganization was
sufficient to break the organization from its old pattern so
that it now may seize the initiative for management reform that
was lost fifty years earlier. Hopefully the budgetary and non-
budgetary functions will attract men of the proper experience
and inclinations who can work together with common purpose.
And while the political climate shows little propensity to
change, the new organization has an improved mechanism to
better develop, substantiate and sell the needed programs of
management improvement. The Bureau of the Budget left an




The Bureau of the Budget may have its
institutional biases, but its professional
resources, knowledge of the Government as a
whole, general perspective, and dedication to
the interests of the Presidency cannot be
duplicated by any other Government agency.
The Bureau has a single client and a single
constituency—the President of the United
States.
1
Should the Domestic Council work out, the improvement
in policy formulation should take a significant load from the
back of the Office of Management and Budget. With reduced
policy considerations, the Office should be better able to
accomplish both its budgetary and non-budgetary functions.
Former Deputy Director of the Bureau, William D. Carey, has
stated: "If the Domestic Council can be made to work, and if
the strengths of the Office of Management and Budget are
preserved and coupled with the Council, the presidency can take
2
a long step toward addressing its responsibilities."
Success will not come easily. Separation of the policy
function is not easily defined or implemented. An early
indication is that Ehrlichman, Executive Director of the
Domestic Council, is still deep in operations, while Shultz
is still in the policy business. ^ Further, as close as Shultz
^IkM.. » P. 189.
2William D« Carey, "Reorganization Plan No. 2: Remarks
by William D. Carey, " Public Ad^ini^rajy^nJ^vJ;ew, XXX
(November/December, 1910)* £32".
5John Osborne, "The Nixon Watch: White House Staff,"
The New Republic, CLXIII (October 3, 1970), 13.
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is working with the President, it seems unlikely that he will
ever get far removed from the policy function.
But where does policy begin and end? There seems no
clear distinction which satisfactorily separates policy from
its implementation. From this standpoint, it would appear that
opponents of Reorganization Plan No. 2 were correct. But if
separation of the policy function is considered to be
descriptive of different policy levels rather than a real
separation, then the situation may be somewhat different. A
new policy-making institution has been created. If the
President, with the assistance of the Domestic Council and the
top levels of the Office of Management and Budget, can produce
more coherent, more rational broad-term policies, then
implementation down each successive level in the Office of
Management and Budget will be better coordinated and on target.
Hopefully this is the way it is working out, for clearly no
definitive separation of the policy function is possible.
Perhaps this is what Ash had in mind when he acknowledged that
men of good faith would be required to fill the gaps.
The new organization of the budgetary activities would
appear to make the budget process more responsive to broad-
range policy decisions. This has been reported to have an
impact on the development of the Fiscal Year 1972 budget.
^Bonafede, "Influence in a New Manner," 151.
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Y/hile this may be good or bad, the dissatisfaction of the
budget examiners may provide some insight into early reports
that the personnel of the Office had been badly demoralized.
Carey reported that: "Visiting the Office of Management and
Budget, one discovers the unmistakable mood of injury and
disquiet." He further states: "While "the Bureau has not lost
power (and may actually have gained some), it has suffered a
blow to its institutional pride. This is no small thing. t'^
o
In contrast, more recent indications would imply that the mood
Carey reports was at worst a temporary result of the
reorganization. A certain amount of uneasiness during a major
reorganization would seem a natural phenomenon. But some
shake-up of the organization was necessary to pull the Bureau
out of its rut. The budgetary functions were supreme for too
long perhaps, and while they were not cut down so much as the
management side reinforced, only time will tell whether the
damage is real or imaginary, permanent or temporary.
There seems little doubt that the Office of Management
and Budget will, for the present, not be downgraded by the
creation of the Domestic Council. Opponents of Reorganization
Plan Ho. 2 would appear to have been concerned for the wrong
people. It was early reported that the Assistant Directors of
^Carey, "Reorganization Plan No. 2," 633-634-.
^The Interviews with both Baldwin and Parker indicate
generally excellent morale after some natural uneasiness
during the unsettling period of reorganization. Further,
Parker indicates that dissatisfaction, if any, is largely
confined to the budget examiners who resent the politically
appointed Assistant Directors now between them and the Director.
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the Office of Management and Budget, and heads of concerned
agencies had been told by Shultz that the Assistant Directors
should be considered as the President's "desk men" to whom
department and agency heads should first turn when they have
business with the President. In that the Assistant Directors
work for Shultz, and not the President, no amount of persuasion
to the contrary is likely to assuage the doubts of Cabinet-
level department heads who prefer to believe that they, are the
President's men. On the other hand, all members of the Ash
Council are reported to be in unanimous agreement that the
influence of the cabinet officers will actually increase under
the new set-up. "Their argument-~not wholly persuasive-
insists that with equal status (in the Domestic Council) these
men will be brought in on decision making as never before."2
Whatever the cause, the original argument against the possible
downgrading of the Office of Management and Budget has now been
modified. Holifield is now quoted as saying: "The Domestic
Council makes policy and hands it over to the OBM. " Further,
the Domestic Council "is taking the place of the Cabinet. lou
are going to see the deterioration of the prestige that goes
with the Cabinet. . . . In any event, this must be considered
10sborne, "White House Staff," 13-14.
2Pa trick J. McGarvey, "Reshaping the White House: A
Parable of Elephants and Trees, " Government Executive . II
(July, 1970), 56.
3Bonafede, "Influence in a New Manner," 164.
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a manifestation of Shultz's relationship with President Nixon
rather than solely the result of Reorganization Plan No. 2.
The number of variables determining a function which
seeks to evaluate an organization with the pov;er and position
of the Office of Management and Budget must inevitably result
in an extremely complex equation. With the addition of the
people element, the situation becomes so infinitely complex
that even time may not reveal the true result. While it is
true that it is too soon to attempt a comprehensive evaluation
at this time, the passing of time will involve new people, new
values and new methods of operation. Nevertheless, the new
Office of Management and Budget would appear to be a viable
aEL(i flexible instrument for the future. When Moynlhan left the
White House staff in January, 1971, he was quoted as saying:
"Whether it's a better budget bureau or not is unknown at this
time, but institutionally it's better."1
The Office of Management and Budget's management
function has been a long time evolving. Prom its inception in
1921, through Infancy in 1939, into adolescence in subsequent
years, it has institutionally been a difficult growth. But
while the creation of the Office of Management and Budget may
optimistically mark its institutional maturity, institutions do






In the end, the question will not be whether
the Domestic Council, or the Office of i-lanagement
and Budget did well or poorly, but whether the
aggregate leadership and performance of the
presidency meets expectations of quality,
sensitivity, and decisiveness. Machinery enters
into that calculation to be sure, but machinery
per se does not make a presidency.^
1Carey, "Reorganization Plan No. 2," 631.

APPENDIX A
SECTION 209, THE BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING ACT, 1921, AS AMENDED
Sec. 209. The Bureau, when directed by the President,
shall make a detailed study of the departments and establish-
ments for the purpose of enabling the President to determine
what changes (with a view of securing greater economy and
efficiency in the conduct of the public service) should be made
in (1) the existing organization, activities, and methods of
business of such departments or establishments, (2) the
appropriations therefore, (3) the assignment of particular
activities to particular services, or T4) the regrouping of
services. The results of such study shall be embodied in a
report or reports to the President, who may transmit to
Congress such report or reports or any part thereof with his
recommendations on the matters covered thereby. (31 U.S.C. 18)
The President, through the Director of the Bureau of
the Budget, is authorized and directed to evaluate and develop
improved plans for the organization, coordination, and manage-
ment of the executive branch of the Government with a view to
efficient and economical service. (31 U.S.C. 18a)
The President, through the Director of the Bureau of
the Budget, is authorized and directed to develop programs and
to issue regulations and orders for the improved gathering,
compiling, analyzing, publishing, and disseminating of
statistical information for any purpose by the various agencies
in the executive branch of the Government. Such regulations
and orders shall be adhered to by such agencies. (31 U.S.C.
18b)
Note .—The two immediately preceding paragraphs were
enacted as sections 104 and 103 of the Budget and Accounting
Procedures Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 834, and were not
specifically designated as amendments to the Budget and
Accounting Act, 1921. They are included here as codified in
the U.S. Code.
Source: U.S., Bureau of the Budget, "Principal Laws Relating
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REORGANIZATION PLAN NO. 2 OF 1970
Prepared by the President and transmitted to the Senate
and the House of Representatives in Congress assembled,
March 12, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of chapter 9 of
title 5 of the United States Code.
PART I. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
SECTION 101. T^^^teT^XJ^WS^^.^J'P Jfo^JfeAgMiL1^' -"
There are hereby transferred to "the President of the~United
States all functions vested by law (including reorganization
plan) in the Bureau of the Budget or the Director of the Bureau
of the Budget.
SECTION 102. ^Ak9M^SLJX^MM9^^^Ii^^l(l^l''''"^ 8i )
The Bureau of the Budget in the Executive Office "of the
President is hereby designated as the Office of Management and
Budget.
(b) The offices of Director of the Bureau of the
Budget and Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the
offices of Assistant Directors of the Bureau of the Budget
which are established by statute (31 U.S.C. 16a and 16c), are
hereby designated Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
and Assistant Directors of the Office of Management and Budget,
respectively.
(c) There shall be within the Office of Management
and Budget not more than six additional officers, as determined
from time to time by the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget (hereinafter referred to as the Director). Each
such officer shall be appointed by the Director, subject to the
approval of the President, under the classified civil service,
shall have such title as the Director shall from time to time
determine, and shall receive compensation at the rate now or
hereafter prescribed for offices and positions at Level V of
the Executive Schedule (5 U.S.C. 5316).
(d) The Office of Management and Budget and the
Director shall perform such functions as the President may from
time to time delegate or assign thereto. The Director, under
the direction of the President, shall supervise and direct the
administration of the Office of Management and Budget.
(e) The Deputy Director of the Office of Management
and Budget, the Assistant Directors of the Office of Management
and Budget designated by this reorganization plan, and the
officers provided for in subsection (c) of this section shall





(f) The Deputy Director (or during the absence or
disability of the Deputy Director or in the event of a vacancy
in the office of Deputy Director, such other officials of the
Office of Management and Budget in such order as the President
may from time to time designate) shall act as Director during
the absence or disability of the Director or in the event of
a vacancy in the office of Director.
SECTION 103. £e£ords^^j?Oj3er^
The records, property, personnel, and "unexpended balances",
available or to be made available, of appropriations,
allocations, and other funds of the Bureau of the Budget shall,
upon the taking effect of the provisions of this reorganization
plan, become records, property, personnel, and unexpended
balances of the Office of Management and Budget.
PART II. DOMESTIC COUNCIL
SECTION 201. MiaiLM,§MiiLt^X^ii§^ ^S;cy-^--'(a ) There
is hereby established in the Executive Office of the President
a Domestic Council hereinafter referred to as the Council.
(b) The Council shall be composed of the following:
The President of the United States




Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
Secretary of the Interior
Secretary of Labor
Secretary of Transportation
Secretary of the Treasury
and such other officers of the Executive Branch as the
President may from time to time direct.
(c) The President of the United States shall preside
over meetings of the Council: Provided. That, in the event







shall perform such functions as the "President may from time to
time delegate or assign thereto.
SECTION 203. ^§cutivj
<
_D^ejrtoT.--The staff of the
Council shall be headed by an Executive Director who shall be
an assistant to the President designated by the President.
The Executive Director shall perform such functions as the
President may from time to time direct.
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PART III. TAKING EFFECT
SECTION 301. Eff^cUve_d^ite.-»«The provisions of this
reorganization plan shair"take effect as provided by section
906(a) of title 5 of the United States Code, or on July 1, 1970,
whichever is later.
Source: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government
Opera tions , Rejarj&e^ziyj^^^^
Management and Budget; Domestic, CounciD . "Hearings*! before a
SubcdmmTttee of the Comoittee on Government Operations, House
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Source: U.S., Congress, Senate, Suj^^j^iej^yj.^^
^MS^^^^^^J^^^ 3- 1^ ^.* before the Committee on Appropria-
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Source: U.S., Congress, Senate, Sup,T)le,K,e^taJ,_A^^^
te^XlSi^^^JM^JJJ^-^e^ASS* befdre""the Committee on
Appro prrations, United States Senate, on H.R. 19928, 91st
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